Conventional economic theory assumes that¯rms always minimize costs given the output they produce. News articles and interviews with executives, however, indicate that rms from time to time engage in cost-cutting exercises. One popular belief is that¯rms cut costs when they are in economic distress, and grow fat when they are relatively wealthy. We explore this hypothesis by studying how the stock market values of gold mining companies vary with gold prices. The value of a cost-minimizing, pro¯t-maximizing¯rm is convex in the price of a competitively supplied input or output, but we¯nd that the stock values of many gold mining companies are concave in the price of gold. We show that this is consistent with fat accumulation when a¯rm grows wealthy. We then address a number of potential alternative explanations and discuss where fat in these companies might reside.
I. Introduction
Organizations do not generally minimize costs or maximize value. There is sheer ine±ciency or rent dissipation. These stark and | to economists, although probably only to economists | mildly shocking hypotheses suggest a variety of economic research topics.
In this paper we take a simple empirical look at one possible measure of the importance of such \fat," by testing a rather general theoretical property of value maximization. The empirical results suggest that many gold mining companies grow fat when they get rich, and that the amounts concerned may be quite large.
In section II, we present an approach to diagnosing wealth-related rent dissipation.
Our approach is to estimate the second derivative of the value of the¯rm as a function of (exogenous) prices: simple maximizing theory would imply that this value function should be convex, while we show that if wealth creates fat, the value function may tend to be more concave.
We apply this approach to the gold mining industry in section III, estimating the relationship between the price of gold and the stock market valuation of 17 gold mininḡ rms. We¯nd that in many of the¯rms the relationship is signi¯cantly concave, as the \fat" theory might suggest, and contrary to the simple maximizing theory.
Section IV discusses a number of possible alternative explanations for the signi¯cant concavity that we¯nd in the valuation function of nearly half the¯rms in our sample.
Section V asks where the fat may plausibly be coming from. We conclude in section VI.
II. The Response of Firm Value to Price Shocks

A. The Value Response of a Fat-Free Firm
Quite generally, the maximized value of any¯rm is a (non-strictly) convex function of any exogenously-determined price it faces (holding other prices constant).
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This fundamental (and well known) result holds whether the price is that of an input, an output, or a good that is sometimes an input and sometimes an output. The result does not depend on any assumptions about production technology, slopes or elasticities of demand curves.
It does require that the set of technologies available to the¯rm is¯xed and that the price in question is exogenous to the¯rm.
To recall why this is so, note that for any¯xed production plan, the¯rm's value is linear in each price. (Throughout this paper, we use the term \linear" to denote a relationship of constant slope; we do not imply that the relationship passes through the origin.) For example, if a gold mining company ignored any changes in the price of gold and just mined a given quantity, say x ounces, the value of this company would be v(p A similarly linear relationship would hold if, for instance, it were the price of an input such as labor, rather than the price of the¯rm's output, that was changing while thē rm kept the same production plan. Instead of the slope being +x, it would now be ¡L, where L is labor input under that production plan; but, just as before, the slope would not change with the price. Thus, given a production plan x, the value v(p g ; x) of the¯rm would be linear in the price of gold p g . However, the¯rm can switch among production plans, and typically will do so as part of maximizing value. Gold mining¯rms expand output when the price of gold increases and reduce output, e.g., by closing mines, when gold prices fall. Since the¯rm can pro¯tably change production plans when the price changes, the¯rm's maximized value, as a function of that price, is an upper envelope of straight lines, V (p g
)´max
, and hence is convex. This is illustrated in¯gure 1.
As the argument suggests, the degree of convexity is closely related to the extent to which the¯rm pro¯tably adjusts quantities in response to price changes. Since (by the envelope theorem) V While this argument for convexity of the¯rm's value function is straightforward and intuitive when only one price is changing at a time, other prices that the¯rm faces (of either inputs or outputs) may also vary. For example, when we observe changes in the spot price of gold, (expected) future prices of gold are presumably also changing. Thus we need to consider simultaneous changes in multiple prices.
The basic theoretical result goes through in a natural generalization, whose proof is the same as above except that maximized value V is now an upper envelope of hyperplanes rather than of straight lines. Without any claim of originality, we state: If we observed the entire vector p of relevant prices, this proposition would let us test directly for value-maximization. Also, those prices that do not change can of course be dropped from the price vector without a®ecting the prediction. However, some omitted prices may well vary in the sample. Indeed, what we do empirically below is track the empirical relationship between one price | \the" price, p g , of gold, the primary output | and the stock market's assessed value of the¯rm. How is the logic of this relationship a®ected if other, excluded, prices change in a way that is correlated (in the sample) with p g ? We address two versions of this question. First, we ask about prices that the¯rm and investors can observe, but that we do not include in our regressions. Second, we ask about future prices that are uncertain at the observation date.
Omitted (Known) Prices. The e®ect of omitting a relevant price that is observed by market participants at the observation date di®ers according to whether it is linearly or nonlinearly related to the included price(s).
The simplest case is that in which certain excluded prices are perfectly linearly related to p g in the sample. Then the price vectors in the sample lie on a straight line in price space, and the observed functionV (p g ) is the slice of the convex value function that lies above that straight line. Consequently, it is convex as one moves along that straight line, and empirically will appear convex as an apparent or reduced-form function of p g alone.
In particular, of course, a gold-producing¯rm's maximized value will depend on the future prices of gold. By the argument just given, if future gold prices were deterministically and linearly related to our single (quasi-spot) gold price measure, p g , convexity would still hold. Similarly, if the price of a scarce input (such as, perhaps, skilled labor) changed linearly with the price of gold, the theoretical prediction of observed convexity would go through, even if we failed to include wage rates in our regressions.
If the relationship between omitted and included prices is non-linear, the issues are more di±cult. To illustrate, suppose for simplicity that we are dealing only with two prices, N = 2, and examine the observed relationship between p To study the convexity ofV , we calculate:
Thus the observed relationshipV will be convex unless
where the expression in square brackets is positive by convexity of V in the vector (p
).
ThusV will still be convex unless f (¢) is \su±ciently" nonlinear, p 2 is \su±ciently" important in V , and either f is convex and good 2 is an input or else f is concave and good 2 is an output. 
, there is a natural intuition that convexity will carry over. Broadly speaking, V is convex in future prices as well as in today's price, and if expected future prices are linear in today's price, one might expectV to be convex in today's price. This argument would be just a special case of the analysis in equation [2] if the relationship among prices were deterministic. It also goes through (by the previous discussion) if the¯rm were unable to respond to later news about future prices because¯rm value is then linear in these prices. The argument does not completely work, however, if the¯rm will be able to respond to future prices: in that case, the option value resulting from the variability in those prices may vary with today's price.
As an example, imagine that extreme values of p 1 (high or low) correspond to low conditional variances of future prices, so the conditional variance is an inverted U-shape as a function of p. If the option value is an important part of expected pro¯ts in the second period, extreme values of p 1 would then correspond to low expected second-period pro¯ts, and potentially to low present values.
To investigate this problem, consider the following illustrative two-period model. At the beginning of period 1, the¯rm is endowed with a stock S of ore. It learns the¯rst-
The reduced-form value functionV (p 1 ) is of course simply max , so di®erentiating again, Casual observation might suggest that we would expect the opposite: that is, that extremely high values of p 1 probably correspond to high, rather than low, conditional variances (gold prices are high in times of uncertainty). We discuss this empirically in section IV below.
B. Value Response and Fat Accumulation
We saw that value functions should be convex in price if¯rms maximize value. Now we consider an alternative hypothesis. If¯rms systematically tend to accumulate fat when they become wealthy, then the convex relationship could be reversed: the higher is the (maximized) value V , the more fat accumulates, and the net V ¡ F function could potentially be concave. Many observers have suggested that there may be fat that grows as¯nancial constraints are loosened: see for instance Jensen (1986) and other work on agency and free cash°ow, and earlier work by Leibenstein (1966) . We outline next how some such pattern of fat accumulation might explain the empirical¯ndings we describe below.
In the gold mining industry, we hypothesize that high gold prices could induce fat, or rent-dissipating behavior. As we will show, if fat is a su±ciently convex function of wealth, this can reverse the value convexity result, and lead to a concave relationship between the price of gold and the net-of-fat value of the¯rm. Consequently, the curvature of the function relating stock-market value to gold prices may tell us something about the existence and nature of rent dissipation in the industry.
Consider a gold mining company that has value V if it is operated with no fat, where
V is the present value of the stream of future pro¯ts in the fat-free company. The actual stock market value of the¯rm, S, will be
)), where F (V ) is the present value of fat, i.e., the present value of pro¯ts dissipated through ine±ciency, which we take to be a function of V .
Taking the derivative of stock market value with respect to p g , we have then that
))]; [6] which will have the same sign (presumably positive for gold-mining companies) with or without the presence of fat so long as F 
Hence, S 0 0 
we can di®erentiate and divide by V
Now suppose we have observations at two prices: a low price, p L g
, and a higher price p H g .
Since theory tells us that
), and since we presume that fat increases in wealth and hence in price (i.e., 
This gives us an observable lower bound on the fraction of the marginal dollar of wealth gain from an increase in p
that is dissipated as fat, i.e., the quantity F
or \marginal fat." It is one minus the slope on the S function at point B divided by the slope at point A. The bound is strictly positive when S is concave so that S
We also can get an observable lower bound on the total rent dissipation. We have, from convexity of V ,
Since fat is non-negative (so V¸S) and, we assume, weakly increasing in wealth (so
, the right-hand side is at least equal to
)]; [14] and this lower bound on total fat at p H g is positive when S is concave.
Equations [11] and [14] form the basis for interpreting our empirical results in terms of marginal and total fat. They will underestimate the total and marginal fat if (as one would
) > 0). Obviously they could be overestimates if other factors cause (part of) the concavity of S(¢). We discuss alternative interpretations in section IV.
III. Gold Prices and the Valuation of Gold Mining Companies
The gold mining industry is a particularly attractive focus for studying the e®ects of wealth changes on corporate fat, because there are frequent shocks to the price of gold that are exogenous to the gold mining companies we study, and those shocks translate directly into wealth shocks for gold mining¯rms.
Gold mining companies view themselves as price takers in the gold market. The market for gold is worldwide, due to the metal's high value-to-weight ratio and homogeneity, and no producer controls more than a few percent of the annual extraction of new gold.
In addition, demand for gold for industrial/jewelry use can be ful¯lled from existing stock.
Annual production of gold from mines worldwide is less than 2% of existing stock of the metal. Thus, unilateral market power appears to be absent. Coordinated oligopoly interactions seem extremely unlikely given the large number of diverse gold mining¯rms and other holders of gold stocks, and we are aware of no evidence or even allegations of such behavior.
For the analysis outlined in the previous section to be applied directly, changes in the price of the important input or output should be exogenous to the¯rms observed. This means not only that no¯rm has market power, but also that price movements are not driven by aggregate shocks to the observed¯rms, such as new gold discoveries by them or revisions in their estimated reserves. To analyze the e®ect of gold prices on a gold mining¯rm's stock market value one would want to control for market-wide stock price movements, because those movements may represent, among other things, interest-rate changes or expected changes that would a®ect gold mine stock prices directly.
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Thus, we begin with the standard CAPM market model of equity returns:
where R is the rate of return, the i subscript refers to the observed¯rm, the m subscript refers to the market, and the f subscript refers to the riskfree rate of return. We multiply both sides of [15] by the stock value of the¯rm at t ¡ 1 to get the equation in terms of the change in¯rm value:
where ¢ indicates the di®erence between the period t and period t¡1 value of the variable.
We then specify explicitly the e®ect of the price of gold, which would otherwise be included in the error term.
Recall that we are interested in the curvature of the relationship between S and p g . This might be measured by the second derivative of a levels equation. Since our equation is in di®erences, we include the di®erence/derivative of a quadratic relationship between stock , then dS =°1dp
So, we estimate the equation
where S is the stock market value of the¯rm, p g is the price of gold, I is a value-weighted stock market index, 9 and ®'s are parameters. In this model, ® 3 is the estimate of the CAPM¯.
of the relationship between the price of gold and the value of the¯rm.
We examine the stock market values of 17 gold mining companies that are traded in the U.S or Canada. We arrived at this dataset by examining lists of U.S. and Canadian gold producers and including each¯rm that (a) produced at least 10,000 ounces of gold in 1996, (b) mined gold predominantly or exclusively in the U.S., Canada, and Australia (we used this criterion to minimize the e®ect of political risk), (c) was primarily in the gold mining business, and (d) was publicly traded and is covered by the CRSP stock market data. This produced 21¯rms. We then eliminated 4¯rms for which fewer than 104 weekly stock observations (2 years of observations) were available. For all 17¯rms used in the analysis, estimation of [17] with just a linear gold price term indicated that the value of the¯rm has a positive and statistically signi¯cant relationship to the price of gold.
The full sample period we use is weekly observations for January 1977 through December 1997, a total of 1095 weeks. Not all¯rms are in the sample for this full period. Graphically, this calculation is a comparison of the slope at point B to the slope at point A in¯gure 2. In terms of our equation [11] , this is S
) ¡ 1. For Alta Gold, if the 4.6% decline in the slope were due solely to fat, this would suggest that when the price of gold increases slightly starting from its median level, at least 4.6% of the incremental gain is dissipated, i.e., is not re°ected in increased shareholder wealth. Recall that (taking the point estimate as correct and assuming all concavity results from fat) this is a lower bound, since the V function is (weakly) convex.
The z-statistic discussed above is one way to aggregate our data across¯rms. Another is to study the response of a portfolio to changes in p g . We calculate this by taking a weighted average of the slopes of the value functions, with each¯rm's weight being its average market capitalization over the time period it is in the sample. We then again calculate by how much the slope of S is estimated to change if p g rises from its 25th
percentile to the 50th percentile value, as a percentage of the slope when p g is at its 25th percentile. The result is an estimated decline of 12:3%, and is signi¯cant at the 5% level.
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If the concavity were due solely to fat, our estimates would also imply a lower bound on the total fat that accumulates when p g increases, as a proportion of the theoretical increase in wealth; in¯gure 2 this proportion is ¢F divided by ¢V . Even if the¯rm is fat-free when p g = $411.00/oz., the aggregate estimate for the 17¯rms would imply that at least 6.1% of the potential wealth gain when the price increases to $482.45 is either not realized or not passed along to shareholders.
B. Estimation of a Piecewise-Linear Value Function
Estimating a quadratic value function is a natural starting point since we are interested in the curvature of the relationship, but the quadratic is quite restrictive. indicates that the slope is signi¯cantly (at the 5% level)
smaller in the top quartile for 9¯rms (7 of which indicated signi¯cant concavity in the quadratic function estimation), signi¯cantly greater in the top quartile for 1¯rm, and the slope is not signi¯cantly di®erent between the quartiles for the remaining 7¯rms.
We calculated for each¯rm the ratio of the estimated slope in the top quartile to the estimated slope in the bottom quartile. The unweighted average of this statistic across the 17¯rms is 0.64, implying that the average slope of S in the top quartile of the gold prices faced by the¯rm is 36% smaller than in the bottom quartile. Thus, again there is strong evidence that for many of these¯rms the slope of the S function is greater when gold prices are low than when they are high.
IV. Alternative Explanations for the Concavity Result
We are tempted to interpret our¯nding of signi¯cant concavity for a number of¯rms in our sample as showing that these¯rms are not maximizing pro¯ts given the prices they face, and in particular as con¯rming the idea that increases in wealth will be (expected by Wall Street to be) dissipated in ine±ciency. There are, however, a number of potential alternative explanations that we need to discuss.
A. Progressive Corporate Pro¯ts Tax
The progressive corporate pro¯ts tax in the U.S. | broadly, zero tax when the¯rm has negative earnings and a linear rate of 34%-48% (at di®erent times in our sample period) when it has more than minimal positive earnings | might explain some concavity in the S(p g ) function, to the extent that this progressivity makes after-tax°ow pro¯ts a concave function of pre-tax°ow pro¯ts. To consider an extreme possibility, suppose that at low values of p g a marginal pre-tax dollar is untaxed, while at high levels it is taxed immediately at rate t. Then taxes would cause the slope of a°ow-pro¯t function at high gold prices to be only 1 ¡ t times what it would be absent taxes, while there is no e®ect at low gold prices.
This calculation is misleading, however, because¯rms can carry forward losses to o®set pro¯ts. To see that e®ect operating starkly, consider another extreme possibility:
suppose that (1) positive pro¯ts are taxed at 48% each year and negative pro¯ts have no tax liability, (2) losses always can be carried forward long enough to o®set future pro¯ts, and (3) the discount rate is zero. In that case, all¯rms would pay 48% on their net (over time) pro¯ts. Any change in wealth from a change in the price of gold would be taxed at 48% regardless of the level of gold prices. In that extreme case, the corporate pro¯ts tax would not a®ect the convexity or concavity of S.
In fact, neither of these extreme possibilities is accurate: the tax code is much more complex. In particular, tax losses can be carried forward only for a limited amount of time, and they lose value when they are carried forward, because of (time) discounting.
Tax losses can also be carried backward. In addition, investment tax credits, opportunities for arbitrage (as when a¯rm with tax losses and a¯rm with tax pro¯ts merge), and international tax treaties greatly complicate the analysis. Still, the ability to smooth taxable income across years means that the marginal tax rate that a¯rm faces is likely to vary much less than would be suggested by a simple view of the corporate pro¯t tax schedule.
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However, these arguments about the e®ect of taxes on accounting after-tax pro¯ts as ), not the year-by-year pro¯ts.
This turns out (surprisingly) to imply that a piecewise-linear tax schedule such as described above is more apt to convexify than to concavify S.
To see why, start by noting that all of the¯rms we study have positive stock market values. A positive stock market value implies that the present value of expected after-tax pro¯ts of the¯rm is positive, which implies that the present value of expected before-tax pro¯ts of the¯rm is also positive.
Next, recognize that in the presence of the two-rate tax system described (no tax on negative earnings and a constant tax rate t on positive earnings), a¯rm with positive present value of future before-tax earnings faces a present value of tax liability that is at least a proportion t of the present value of its future before-tax earnings. The proportion will be exactly t if either the¯rm never makes a loss in any tax period or the¯rm can fully o®set losses against earlier or later pro¯ts (which requires, among other things, no discounting). But if the¯rm ever makes losses and those losses cannot fully o®set pro¯ts then the \present value average tax rate" | the present value of its tax liability divided by the present value of its future earnings | will be greater than t.
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Thus, for a¯rm with positive expected present value of earnings, the present value average tax rate is higher when the¯rm is more likely to have negative earnings years.
Negative earnings surely are more likely when gold is cheap, so the present value average tax rate is most likely to decline as gold prices rise. This seems more likely to convexify S than the reverse.
Empirically, columns (5) and (6) e®ective marginal tax rate in any one year more responsive to earnings in the year. Wē nd concavity of S functions in both periods.
B. Omission of Relevant Correlated Prices
We noted in section II that if an important price were non-linearly related to p g , a spurious concave relationship between¯rm stock market value and the price of gold we examine could arise. For instance, if the ten-year-out futures price of gold were concave in our gold price regressor p g , our reported results could obtain even if S were convex in the two prices jointly (as optimizing theory predicts it should be).
Unfortunately, futures prices for gold did not generally exist for delivery more than two years in the future during our sample period. The longest contract for which prices are available throughout our time frame is that for delivery 12{14 months in the future (the 7th nearest contract). Still, if important \implicit" futures prices were concave in p g , one would expect to see some indication of this in a contract for a claim more than a year in the future.
The simplest approach to testing this explanation would be to include both this more distant futures price and the nearer futures price in the regression. These prices, however, are so highly correlated that doing so increases the standard errors of the estimates to the extent that the estimated second derivatives could not be statistically distinguished from zero or from the estimates that we had obtained without the more distant futures price.
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An alternative approach, however, produces results at odds with this explanation of concavity. If distant future prices are concave in nearby future prices, it follows that nearby future prices are convex in long future prices.
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Thus, omitting the nearby future gold price and using only the more distant future gold price would be omitting a price that is The other potentially important omitted output price is the price of silver. Most gold producers also mine some silver since deposits are often co-located. Of the 17¯rms in our sample, 7 exhibit a positive and statistically signi¯cant¯rst-order e®ect of silver prices on¯rm value in a regression with the changes in the price of both gold and silver.
Column (4) estimated second-order e®ects of gold price changes change somewhat, the basic result that the majority are concave in gold price remains. S is still estimated to be a concave function of the price of gold for 11 of the 17¯rms; for 4 of those the second derivative is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. Also, the second order e®ect of silver is estimated to be concave for most of the¯rms: 13 of the 17 have estimated concave e®ects of the price of silver and for 5 of those, the e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.
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A second category of omitted prices that could potentially be important is input prices.
If the industry faced increasing marginal costs of some input, then it seems conceivable that this could transfer (rather than dissipate) the rents generated from high gold prices. First, the industry executives we talked to did not think it plausibly important (although they did suggest that geologists are better paid when gold prices are high).
Second, changes in the price of long-lived capital that the¯rm owns, rather than rents, would not explain observed concavity. If, for instance, increases in the price of gold raise the value of land on which the gold mine is located, that will not lead to concavity of the S function if the mining¯rm owns the land. While such changes a®ect the opportunity cost of mining, that is exactly o®set by the capital gain or loss that the¯rm enjoys from owning the land. Another way to put this is that changes in the market value of an owned asset do not a®ect the basic argument that the¯rm could continue to use the same production plan | the argument that leads via an upper-envelope e®ect to convexity of V . Third, and perhaps most important, although the industry-level supply curve of some inputs (such as geologists) may be sharply upward-sloping in the short run, so that the short-run e®ect of an increase in p g is to make even inframarginal exploration projects substantially more costly, it is hard to believe that the long-run supply curve of geologists is so steeply upward-sloping as it would need to be to explain our results. Because we examine the e®ects of changes in p g on the stock market estimate of the present value of pro¯ts, e®ects that apply to current-year or near-term future pro¯ts but not to further-out pro¯ts will have limited e®ect on our results. (This is particularly true in a competitive extractive industry such as gold mining, where postponing production during an inputprice spike would not permanently lose production or market position as it might in some other industries.)
C. Debt
One important category of cost is the cost of debt. We have not treated debt as part of the value of the¯rm; we treat it as a cost to equity owners. That cost varies with the value of the¯rm. If it were a convex function of p g , it could conceivably concavify S. We argue, however, that it seems much more likely to convexify S.
The cost to equity-holders represented by a given amount of face-value debt varies with the net present value of the¯rm's earnings (before debt payments) in the way shown in¯gure 4. If the¯rm is worthless (segment A), then the cost of the debt is una®ected by marginal changes in¯rm wealth. The same is true (for di®erent reasons) if the¯rm is doing well (segment C). In between, on segment B, debt payments will vary approximately linearly (indeed, one for one) with¯rm value, since debt holders become the residual claimants.
A standard intuition is that debt may concavify the equity value of the¯rm. This intuition comes from thinking about¯rms whose value varies along segments A and B, in which case the cost of debt is convex in the¯rm's performance and might lead to concavity of the residual equity value.
0
However, we would argue that¯rms with ongoing operations are unlikely to be on segment A and more likely to be on either segment B or segment C. In that B-C range, the cost of debt is concave in (pre-debt)¯rm wealth, tending to convexify the residual S function.
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D. Changing Variance in Gold Prices
In section II we noted that the the stock market value of a maximizing¯rm might be concave in p g , the current price of gold, if the real option value of gold mining, which increases with the variance of future spot gold prices, were a concave function of p 
E. Hedging by Gold Mining Firms
Many gold mining¯rms trade in the gold futures market in order to hedge the risk He¯nds that hedging varies substantially across¯rms. He describes two types of¯nancial hedging that are common in the industry: linear strategies, such as selling gold forward, which reduce thē rm's overall exposure to changes in gold prices, and non-linear strategies, such as buying put options, which protect the¯rm's value only if the price of gold falls below the strike price.
The non-linear insurance strategies used in the industry consist largely of buying options, usually put options. Holding such options will convexify S. As for linear strategies, when a gold mining¯rm sells gold forward at a¯xed price, this of course°attens out thē rm's V (and presumably its S) function; in e®ect, the¯rm has already sold some gold, and so now owns less of it. But such a linear strategy considered in isolation should not a®ect the concavity or convexity of S. A pattern of linear strategies, however, could in principle concavify S, if in our sample period the¯rms we observed e®ectively owned less gold when gold prices were high than when they were low. Such a correlation would make their V functions°atter at high gold prices than at low gold prices, so that¯nding a concave S does not show that S is di®erently shaped than V .
Unfortunately, Tufano's data do not let us infer whether or not that pattern obtained.
Because his data covered only a relatively short time span we cannot infer whether such a pattern happened to occur; and he showed that¯rms' risk management practices were changing, so it is di±cult to infer whether¯rms pursued strategies (hedge more when gold prices are high) that would cause such a pattern. To address this issue empirically, we examined¯rms that engage in little or no hedging.
Peter Tufano provided us a list of¯rms that engaged in no hedging activities in 1990 or 1992. We assumed that if a¯rm showed up as engaged in no hedging in either of these years, then it did little or no hedging in previous years.
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Two¯rms on this list | Coeur D'Alene and Homestake Mining | were also in our dataset for at least four years prior to the beginning of 1992. For those two¯rms, we re-estimated S using only data from prior to 1992.
In each case, the estimated second derivative terms were negative (concave S) and signi¯cant at the 5% level. The estimated proportional declines in the slopes of S when p g increases from $411.00 to $482.45 are 9.2% and 6.1% respectively.
In any case, even today,¯rms seldom hedge more than the equivalent of a few years of their production, so most of their expected future production at any time remains unhedged, especially in light of the \replace your output" rule of thumb discussed below in section V.A. Thus, for both theoretical and empirical reasons, hedging practices are unlikely to explain the concavity we¯nd for some¯rms.
F. Optimal Labor/Executive Compensation Contracts
For incentive or risk-sharing reasons it might be optimal to give managers or workers equity or options in the company. Our analysis is una®ected if they hold equity, because the market value of the¯rm includes all shareholders. But if they hold options, this could concavify the (remaining) value function of the actual shareholders in the¯rm.
Similarly, if wages and salaries increase more than linearly with p g as part of an optimal labor contract (explicit or implicit), this could concavify S, because an increasing share of wealth gains from gold price increases would go to workers, rather than shareholders. Indeed, it would do so in a way very like the \fat" mechanism described above, although we might interpret it di®erently.
But it seems very unlikely that executive compensation tied to earnings could account for more than a trivial fraction of the large concavities we¯nd in a substantial number of our sample¯rms. Gold mining companies pay a very small fraction of¯rm value as executive compensation.
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This is not surprising, because a comparatively large share of¯rm value is represented by tangible, transferable assets. That is, much of the¯rm value is due to its holdings of land or rights to mine, not value creation by the operations of the¯rm. Furthermore,¯rm value changes are largely due to events (in this case, gold price shocks) that are exogenous to the¯rm. Incentive/compensation theory suggests that optimal compensation plans should not award managers a signi¯cant share of¯rm value changes that result from exogenous events.
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Mining labor costs are a much larger share of¯rm operating costs than managerial compensation. We discuss this in section V.
G. Environmental Liabilities
Another possible non-fat explanation of concavity would be that gold mining¯rms, which are viewed as causing extensive environmental damage, might be required to pay disproportionately more for clean-up if they are relatively rich. We believe that although environmental liabilities are non-trivial | one source put them at about 15 percent of \hard" costs | this is unlikely to explain the concavity we observe. According to our industry and government sources, most environmental legislation bearing on mining com- panies applies to all mining, not to speci¯c sectors such as gold mining. In this and other ways, industry participants did not see clean-up costs or liabilities as being very much subject to discretion or variation. Relatedly, when we mentioned this hypothesis to government regulators, they commented that it was an interesting idea, but that they were aware of no examples of such behavior. Finally, for environmental liabilities short of bankruptcy to explain any of the concavity we¯nd, they would have to not only increase with the price of gold, but would have to be convex in the price of gold, i.e., the proportion of marginal wealth required by new liability would have to increase with the price of gold.
Finally, one could also ask about \asbestos-style" liabilities, which with some probability will bankrupt the¯rm. For such risks to cause concavity, however, the probability of a bankrupting liability would have to be signi¯cantly increasing in p g .
H. Royalty Payments
Sometimes governments (or owners of auriferous properties who delegate the mining) require payment of royalties for gold extraction. A linear royalty schedule (whether on units, revenues, or pro¯ts), like a linear tax schedule, would not a®ect the predictions of convexity. However, royalty rates that increase with the price of gold (or with the total revenues attributable to a mine, for instance) could potentially cause concavity of the value function. Accordingly, we asked our industry and government contacts to comment on this possibility. It appears from our discussions that royalties are most often linear. There are some royalties that kick in above a certain point, and others that are capped; thus some would contribute to concavity and others tend towards convexity. Some royalties are based on accounting net pro¯ts, but one well-informed commentator suggested that it is viewed as unwise for an agent who can extract royalty payments to take a percentage of the net, because doing so stimulates cost accountants' creativity in undesirable ways, somewhat as it is said to do in the case of Hollywood movies.
We also note that the hypothetical examples this source used in discussing the matter with us had royalty rates of 1 percent or a few percent, except for one that was ten percent of accounting pro¯ts. Other industry sources also tended to come up with examples involving a few percentage points. This might itself hint that royalties as a whole are unlikely to be driving our results.
Finally, we learned of Centurion, a company that specializes in exploration and royalty collection: it sells properties on which gold deposits have been found to mining companies and collects royalties. If it imposed more-than-linear royalties, one would expect its S(¢) function to be correspondingly convex. In fact, our estimated S function for Centurion was concave (although not statistically signi¯cantly concave).
2 8
I. Negative Correlation between Gold Price and Gold Reserves
The theory above, together with a Hotelling version of the random walk theory of gold
), where
) is the¯rm's economic reserves of gold.
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The optimizing theory that we test assumes that e is increasing in p g . While higher gold prices clearly do make more gold economic to extract, this causal e®ect could be obscured if other factors induce a negative correlation (in general or in our sample) between economic reserves and gold prices.
Such negative correlation of reserves and gold prices could be just a°uke during our sample period. Less coincidentally, an industrywide improvement in exploration or extraction technology could increase the economic reserves of a typical¯rm, and also cause a decrease in gold prices through an increase in (expected) market supply. Or, when prices rise, mining¯rms might increase extraction (and/or forward sales) of gold even more than they increase discoveries of new economic reserves, which would create a negative correlation of reserves (on which the company has claim) and prices.
In fact, the real price of gold trended downward since 1980, which includes most of A. Exploration Costs.
All the managers we spoke with seemed to believe that | either as an obviously sound business policy, or because of pressure from stock-market analysts | it is imperative for a gold-mining¯rm to \replace" its extraction, whether by exploration for new reserves or by acquisition of existing mines (or of their owners). Several suggested that when gold prices are high,¯rms found themselves \having to", or perhaps \able to", engage in quite unpromising exploration projects.
Because it is much harder to verify whether an exploration decision is value-increasing than whether a mine is being well managed, exploration seems a likely locus for potentially value-reducing expenditures. In related work, when we found concavity of S and then looked for sources of fat in the oil industry (Borenstein and Farrell, 1996) , we were told by oil industry commentators that the industry dissipated a great deal of the value increase during the early 1980s by \excessive" (at least ex post) exploration. Clearly, a price increase should induce some increase in exploration activity, but it is suggested that the oil industry's response was excessive.
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In the gold mining industry, the apparent rule of thumb that¯rms believe they must replace extraction also suggests a possible simple principal-agent theory for value dissipation after gold price increases. Suppose that mine managers have incentives to increase output when p g rises, in a way that takes account of increased extraction costs but does Another possible theory, attributing the anomaly to the¯nancial markets rather than to a principal-agent problem, would be that some¯rms try to resist this rule of thumb and are penalized by stock-market analysts who are trained to look for growth or at least sustainability of revenue°ows. Several executives told us that they believe analysts behave in this way.
B. Non-Optimal Labor Compensation.
As mentioned earlier, if labor takes an increasing fraction of¯rm wealth as the latter grows, it could account for concavity of the net (i.e., stock market) value function. To the extent that this goes beyond an optimal ex ante contract and becomes an ine±cient ex post holdup or asset-stripping, one might characterize it as a form of fat. Though it is sometimes di±cult to distinguish e±cient from ine±cient variations in labor compensation, it is di±cult to see how it would be e±cient to reward miners for changes in¯rm value driven by exogenous changes in the price of gold. But, while such labor rent-sharing has been documented in some industries, 3 3 our discussions with industry participants suggested that it is not likely to be much of an issue in gold mining. None reported that wages moved noticeably with the price of gold.
VI. Conclusion
Once one is willing to consider the idea that there could be ine±ciency in¯rms, it might be natural to suspect that¯rms will engage in more waste as corporate wealth grows. We have examined this theory empirically in the gold mining industry. We found that many gold mining¯rms' stock-market values do not increase as much in response to gold price increases when the price of gold is already high as when it is lower. This empirical result contradicts the theoretical convexity result that stems from the upper-envelope, or real option, e®ect.
The concavity result is particularly striking in the gold mining industry, as real options are important in¯rms' business decision making. Firms consciously and substantially vary their scope of operations and level of production in response to changes in the price of gold. Such°exibility in production plans would (following standard theory) suggest that the value of the¯rm should be strongly convex as a function of the price of gold. It is not.
We posit that much of the observed concavity results from investors' beliefs that (some)¯rms will dissipate a share of wealth gains and that this share will be larger when the¯rm is wealthy than when it is under greater¯nancial pressure. We also discuss a number of alternative explanations for the concavity results and conclude that they do not credibly explain away our evidence. 
